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The correlation between air carrier pilot performance and age, total flight time, total
airline flight time, and time in current position has not been fully documented. This study
observed 62 F/Os in line operations and graded 74 knowledge, skills, and abilities
performance variables, utilizing a five-point Likert scale. Knowledge items scored
slightly below the referent, with no improvement over time; skills improved with both
flight time and years of service; and abilities declined markedly across all independent
variables. Changes to pilot training syllabi and techniques, as well as hiring practices,
may be indicated. Integrating Pilot Proficiency Audit data into existing LOS A, AQP,
ASAP, and FOQA programs can provide a more robust air carrier safety program.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Background
The history of commercial aviation in the United States (U. S.), the safest and
most efficient air transportation system in the world, is a testament to continuous change.
From propellers to jets, from simple radio navigation to Global Positioning Systems
(GPS), and from "see and avoid" to the Enhanced Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) II, virtually every aspect of the industry has been host to remarkable
technological development. These improvements have played a major role in the decline
of the air carrier accident rate, from about 30 hull loss accidents per million departures in
the early 1960s to about 2 per million in 2000. However, as pointed out by the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA's) Safer Skies Initiative, at the current rate the
worldwide aviation community can expect one major hull loss accident every week by
2010 (Boeing, 2002)!
Safety initiatives are ongoing in many areas, including controlled flight into
terrain (CFIT), runway incursions, loss of aircraft control, weather detection and
avoidance, and pilot decision making. These efforts are a real step forward in the
industry's stated goal of reducing the fatal accident rate by 80% in the next 5 years. From
a larger perspective, however, aviation safety is only achieved by building many layers of
overlapping defenses; only by accurately predicting the circumstances that can lead to
1
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accidents and incidents can we hope to build effective barriers or defenses into the
aviation system. Because these barriers must depend on personnel and equipment
functioning in a reliable and predictable manner, quality management systems have
become increasingly important.
In the early years of aviation safety, the mantra seemed to be 'fly it, crash it,
redesign it, fly it, crash it. . .' resulting in only modest improvements over time. System
safety principles, as commonly practiced by most major air carriers now, require that
mechanisms be in place to:
1. Identify and manage safety risks where they are predicted to be the greatest.
2. Build and maintain appropriate layers of defense (barriers to risk).
3. Measure the barrier's ongoing effectiveness.
4. Evaluate system risks for prevention of accidents and mitigation of
consequences (Mein, 2002).
This process approach to aviation safety is reflected in other quality management
standards, specifically the International Organization for Standardization's (ISO's)
9000:2000. These standards describe the processes used by an organization to
demonstrate its ability to consistently and reliably provide a product (in this case, safety)
that meets customer and applicable regulatory requirements, and provides a basis for
continual improvement and business excellence. Several airlines are actively seeking ISO
9000 certification for their flight safety departments.
The FAA has embraced the use of quality management principles in aviation
safety by instituting the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS). This new
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approach to airline certification and surveillance oversight was implemented in 1998.
Unlike earlier traditional oversight methods:
ATOS incorporates the structured application of new inspection tasks,
analytical processes, and data collection techniques to the oversight of
individual air carriers. This approach enables Flight Standards inspectors
to be more effective in the oversight of air carriers by focusing on the most
critical safety aspects of an air carrier's operation. As currently applied,
ATOS provides a systematic process for conducting surveillance,
identifying and dealing with risks, and providing data and analysis to
guide the oversight of each carrier. (FAA, 2002, Overview, f 1)
ATOS was developed from the ISO 9000:2000 guidelines, and the two quality
mechanisms share many philosophical and "process" attributes. Most important among
those, however, is the fundamental requirement for data-based measurement of the
airline's safety product (pilot proficiency, training, flight operations, etc.), enhancements
to operational systems, and effectiveness of those improvements. Unlike the more
traditional methods of subjective safety analysis, accurate and reliable data is the
hallmark of a modern air carrier's overall safety program.

An Air Carrier's Data-based Safety Programs
There are four commonly used processes for gathering operational performance
data. The Line Oriented Safety Audit is an observational study, the Aviation Safety
Action Program relies on voluntary participant reports, Flight Operations Quality
Assurance monitors aircraft performance, and the Advanced Qualification Program
maintains pilot proficiency through advanced training concepts. These programs all
collect useful data; currently it is up to the air carrier to determine how that information is
analyzed, and what other data should be gathered to best enhance operational safety.
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Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA)
The Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA) is a relatively new safety initiative that
uses expert observers to collect data regarding air carrier flight crew performance on
normal, scheduled flights. All observations are conducted under strict, non-jeopardy
conditions, assuring complete anonymity to the crew. Typically observers are selected
from all organizations involved in the audit process, including the LOSA provider, airline
management, and the pilots union. Originally begun as an FAA research project in 1996,
LOSA was further developed at the University of Texas at Austin and has become the
central focus of the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO's) current flight
safety and human factors program (Maurino, 2002).
Information collected includes those risks and errors external to the flight deck,
crew errors, and crew actions to mitigate and manage both risk and error. Five specific
types of error are defined in the LOSA: (a) procedural, (b) communication, (c)
proficiency, (d) decision making and (e) intentional non-compliance, or violations of
regulations (Helmrich, in press). The newest generation of LOSA has incorporated the
latest conceptual models of threat and error management. "This change greatly enhanced
the usefulness of LOSA for airlines, expanding it from a crew resource management
(CRM) audit to one which places skills into perspective as operational threat and error
countermeasures" (Helmrich, 2002, p. 7).
As outlined by James Klinect (2002), a successful LOSA study will always have
the following 10 characteristics:
1. Observations are made during normal flight operations.
2. Crews volunteer to participate.
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3. Data collection is anonymous, confidential and safety-minded.
4. The study has joint (management & union) sponsorship.
5. The observation instrument has appropriate targets - flight crew performance
in normal operations.
6. The study employs trusted and trained observers.
7. The study has a trusted data collection site.
8. Data are scrutinized before data analysis, to find inaccuracies and consistency.
9. Data are used to identify areas that need enhancements.
10. The results are given to the pilots, (p.8)
Many LOSAs have been completed at various airlines, producing quantitative
views of both external threats and flight crew errors in normal flight operations.
Summarizing the results at three different airlines:
1. External threats and crew errors were pervasive, but differ in their type and
frequencies across airlines.
2. The descent/approach/landing phase of flight contained the most threats,
errors and consequential outcomes.
3. Intentional errors were the most frequent type, but had the least consequence.
4. Proficiency and operational decision errors were the most difficult for the
crews to manage.
5. Automation and checklist usage produced the most common errors, many of
which went undetected.

6
6. CRM behavior is effective in error management. Positive traits include strong
leadership, vigilance, and communication skills, as well as effective
contingency planning (Klinect, Wilhelm, & Helmrich, 1999, p.687).

Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)
In 1976 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) introduced
the first voluntary self-disclosure program for the reporting of aviation operational errors.
That program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), continues to provide
valuable data. However, confidentiality and jurisdictional requirements severely limit its
ability to correct identifiable aviation hazards.
Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAPs) are proactive safety initiatives. They
are; (a) airline specific, (b) voluntary, (c) self-reporting, and (d) non-punitive. Any
employee covered by the airline's plan (usually pilots and dispatchers) can submit an
event report that is either a possible Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) violation, or a
general or specific flight concern. Strict confidentiality is maintained within the program,
and with certain limitations, the event reporters are protected from regulatory or
certificate action.
An Event Review Team (ERT) composed of airline, labor union, and FAA
personnel collaborate on the details of the event, and must reach unanimous consensus on
whatever corrective actions to be taken. That action can be either an administrative FAA
letter (warning, correction, or no action taken), a response from the ERT directly, or a
return of the report to the flight operations department (no FAR violation potential).
Recent analysis shows that the ERTs are very effective in reaching that consensus
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through a hierarchy of shared values, a working buffer to exclude
distractions, and sideband communications that build trust. ASAP appears
to be a highly effective cultural mechanism for identifying novel and
subtle hazards, and designing rapid, mutually acceptable corrective
actions. (Ganter, Dean & Cloer, 2000, p. iii)
These programs are proving to be very successful; there are currently 20 airlines with
active ASAP programs (Longridge, 2002).

Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA)
Aircraft flight recorders were first introduced in the 1950s as an aid to the aircraft
accident investigator. Mandated by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (later the FAA)
in 1958, these devices are physically mounted in the tail of commercial aircraft, and are
designed to capture and store virtually all of an airplane's normal flight parameters.
Initially, these recorders were simple, scribe and foil recording mechanisms which used a
hard, pointed stylus to physically imprint markings onto a rotating drum of metallic foil.
It proved to be an effective design, but rather complex, and subject to mechanical failure
and very limited in storage capacity. The latest designs (digital, solid state recorders) can
easily track and store hundreds of in-flight aircraft parameters, over a much greater
sampling time period.
Most parameters are captured every second, but many, especially engine
indications (temperatures, pressures, etc.), can be sampled at much greater rates if
necessary. This is particularly helpful for maintenance quality assurance. Flight
parameter information is still used in the investigative capacity, but the newest recording
systems have been supplemented with additional hardware, the Quick Access Recorder
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(QAR), which provides immediate and constant availability, and thus monitoring, of the
aircraft data.
An airline's Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program is responsible
for reviewing all this data on a routine basis, gathering valuable information on crew
actions and aircraft operations. This provides "a valid, empirical record of crew inputs to
controls, aircraft navigation and engine parameters .. . contributing to safety by
identifying error inducing environmental conditions at certain airports and trends in crew
behaviour over time" (Helmrich, 2002, p. 6). The information can be used to improve
effectiveness of operational procedures, maintenance and engineering procedures, other
safety programs, and pilot training. The concept is controversial - but as Norman
Mineta, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, recently stated, "Aviation safety must be taken
to a new level, a level that won't be achieved by doing things the way they have been
done in the past" (Mineta, 2002).
The key to FOQA acceptance with pilots is that the data is collected within strict
non-jeopardy guidelines, providing immunity even if evidence of a procedural violation
is found. Because the data is protected from public disclosure by FAA order (49 U.S.C.
40123), air carriers voluntarily share this and other safety information with the FAA.

Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)
The introduction of the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) by the FAA in
1991 fundamentally changed the traditional concepts of flight crew training. The new,
alternative methods of qualifying and certifying pilots under Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Parts 121 and 135 are strictly proficiency-based, and are airline specific. An air
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carrier7 s participation is voluntary, but the benefits realized from implementation of AQP
include: training tailored to the carrier's operation, cost reductions due to more efficient
scheduling of training, and enhanced flight crew proficiency (Kaempf & Klinger, 1993).
As flexible as the program may be, however, there are a few mandated FAA
requirements:
1. The program must be airplane specific to each make, model, or series of aircraft,
and include basic indoctrination, qualification, and continuing qualification
curriculums for every duty position.
2.

The training should be conducted with a full crew complement (Captain and
First Officer), and must include a Line Operational Evaluation (LOE). The LOE
consists of a simulator-based, real-time flight scenario designed to address
specific flight operations and CRM skills.

3. Instructor/evaluators must be trained in specific strategies to assure reliable pilot
performance and standardization verification. They must also collect proficiency
data on students, for internal evaluation of curriculum development and to supply
to the FAA (Longridge, 1997). Data that is collected is routinely stored in two
databases: a Program Audit Database (PADB) and a Pilot Performance Database
(PPDB). The PPDB contains all pilot initial qualification, LOE, Initial Operating
Experience (IOE), and continuing qualification results (Holt, 1997).
Pilot performance as assessed by the AQP is done in a full flight simulator. The
various checks consist of Maneuver Validation and Line Oriented Flight Training
(LOFT). Maneuver Validation, or "first look," consists of a series of specific, predetermined, maneuvers (engine failure at Vi, stalls, etc.). The LOFT employs a series of
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"event sets" which make up a complete flight scenario, to be flown in real time by a
complete flight crew. The emphasis is on CRM, decision making, and teamwork. The
importance of CRM in the overall context of AQP is evident in recent efforts to "remove
the separation between CRM and technical training [flight skills] to encourage crews to
treat utilization of good CRM skills as little different from employing effective technical
skills" (Mangold & Neumeister, 1995, p. 556).
The collection of valid, reliable data is critical to the success of this, or any other
proficiency-based program. A complete discussion of the principles of accurate AQP data
collection can be found in later in this report.

Comparative Analysis of Programs
These four primary data-gathering safety programs provide air carriers
operational information essential for monitoring and improving safety. Each has
advantages over the other, and each one has certain limitations inherent to the program.
Table 1 is a matrix that illustrates the individual air carrier safety programs and the pilot
proficiency information that each was designed to measure.
Pilot performance can be classified into three basic areas: Knowledge, skills, and
abilities. For purposes of this thesis, the following definitions are assumed:
1. Knowledge - those facts, policies, and procedures that are taught to a student
pilot by the airline, and for which the pilot has the responsibility to remember.
Examples would be company policies as contained in the Administrative
Manual and aircraft operating limitations as contained in the Flight Handbook.
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2. Skills - those flying skills that are taught to the student pilot by the airline
during initial training, including all techniques applicable to a particular type
Table 1
Types of Data Generated by an Air Carrier's Safety Programs
Attribute

Personnel

Scenario

Crew

Rehearsed
Line ops

Knowledge
Individual
Crew
Skills
Individual
Crew
Abilities
Individual
•

FOQA

ASAP

LOSA

D

•

AQP

PPA

•
•
•

Rehearsed

•

Line ops

•

D

•

Rehearsed
Line ops
Rehearsed

•

•

•

•

Line ops

•

•

•

•
•

Rehearsed
Line ops

•
•

Line ops

Denotes primary area of observation

•
•

Rehearsed

•

•

Denotes secondary area of observation

of aircraft to be flown at the airline. Not included would be normal "stick and
rudder" skills that the pilot would have brought with him to the job. Examples
would be a crosswind landing or engine start in the aircraft normally flown.
3. Abilities - those attributes that are individual, that are not taught by the
airline, and are reflected in all aspects of a pilot's professional career.
Examples include workload management, decision making, attitude and
personal appearance.
All three categories can be observed as either crew-based or individual attributes. Both
knowledge and skill can be further refined into those events that are rehearsed and those
that are observed during normal line operations. Abilities, as individual traits, are always
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present, and are assumed to be constant in any situation. The focus of any observational
program can be to detect negative performance, i.e. errors (FOQA and ASAP), or to
detect positive performance (LOSA). Two (AQP and the Pilot Proficiency Audit, or PPA)
can do both.
FOQA embodies the simplest concepts of any of the safety programs. Aircraft
performance data is collected, and the flight skills of an individual (person flying) or to a
lesser extent the flight crew (decision making) can be documented. Because there is no
observer "intrusion" into the flight deck, it provides a very reliable, although limited,
view of a pilot's flight skills during normal airline operations. In a sense, the "what"
happened is evident, but not the "why" it happened.
ASAP provides some of the same information, but can be distorted due to the
reporting mechanism. Information regarding piloting skills and knowledge (individual
and crew-based) may be discernable. But since all of the data is self-reported, the validity
and reliability of the reporting may be suspect. Its strengths lie in the volume of data
generated, trending of improvements initiated, and overall awareness of safety issues; not
the monitoring of pilot knowledge, skills, and abilities.
LOSA is an observational process, and provides excellent information regarding
flight crew performance in a normal line operational environment. Crew-based
knowledge, skills, and abilities can be reliably documented. An individual's knowledge
and skill level can also be observed, but the purpose of the audit is almost exclusively to
assess the CRM, decision-making, and threat and error management of a line flight crew.
AQP is exclusively a training program, and is not intended to capture any
performance metrics during normal line operations. The flight maneuvers that are
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assessed during AQP are performed in a simulator, and are known and practiced for
beforehand. The LOFT sessions, while similar to real world conditions, are simulated,
and trainees are aware of scenario details prior to the training session. AQP, then,
provides an excellent look at the performance of a flight crew (both knowledge and skill)
in a rehearsed, simulated environment. Through "first look" maneuvers, it can also detect
individual flying skills, and to a lesser extent, individual knowledge.
A complete air-carrier safety program must provide reliable data in all pilot
performance categories; knowledge, skills, and abilities. Referring to Table 1, it becomes
evident that there are some areas that are not documented utilizing only these four
programs. Information regarding individual flying skills in a line environment should be
supplemented by observation of positive events. Awareness of an individual pilot's
knowledge in the line environment is almost completely lacking, and there is no method
by which an airline can routinely and reliably assess an individual's abilities.
The industry, however, is aware of this shortfall. As stated in a recent data basing
study, "In addition to the required AQP databases, possible carrier databases that would
give relevant information include . . . a database focused on pilot Knowledge, Skills, and
Abilities (KSA)." Furthermore, "the pilot KSA database could include demographic data
such as pilot experience, (total hours, hours in type), individual skill/ability assessments,
and other measures such as [pilot's] attitudes" (Holt, 1997, p. 58).

The Pilot Proficiency Audit (PPA)
To observe and document those categories of pilot performance that are not
currently assessed, an airline-wide PPA could be performed. The PPA, in some ways
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similar to a LOSA audit, would utilize trained pilot observers to monitor line operations
in a confidential, non-jeopardy environment. Emphasis would be on individual (not crew)
performance, and would include pilot interviews as well as observations. Consistency of
grading would be enhanced by utilizing a standard instrument, a simple Likert scale,
advanced training, and a limited number of observers. The recording instrument should
be easy to use, clear in its intent, and familiar to the observers.
Certain demographics of the subject population are a matter of record. Date of
hire, age, total flight time, total flight time with the air carrier, and time in current aircraft
are known for all air carrier pilots. This data could be correlated with specific scores to
determine pilot performance trends. The results could be used to improve both ground
and flight training techniques and syllabi; to support new training or monitoring efforts;
and could be valuable in the new-hire pilot selection process.

Statement of the Problem
The correlation between pilot performance and selected personal and professional
factors has not been fully documented. Data generated as a result of a properly designed
pilot proficiency study could prove very valuable as yet another component in the overall
data-collection processes of an air carrier's safety program.

Research Questions
The research questions that were addressed were: "Within an air carrier's pilot
population, (a) are their KSAs directly related to the pilot's age, company longevity, total
flight time, or time in current position?" and (b) "Could an individual pilot's KSA data be
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integrated effectively into the air carrier's overall data collection processes to enhance
flight safety?"
Delimitations
This PPA was conducted at an air carrier that operated four different types of
large, transport category jet aircraft, with a seniority list of approximately 2,500 pilots.
All observations were of two-pilot crews operating in controlled airspace under CFR Part
121 regulations, and focused specifically on the performance of the air carrier's First
Officers (F/Os). The application of the study methodology, conclusions, and/or
recommendations to any other aviation operator or air carrier may or may not be
appropriate, due to the extensive variations of airline size, aircraft types, operating
philosophies, and cultures.

CHAPTER fl
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH

Summary of Relevant Data
One could assume that since on-the-job performance of all pilots, whether civil,
airline, or military, is constantly and repeatedly measured, that applicable and timely
reference material concerning those measurements would be readily accessible.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Virtually all recent pilot performance studies have
focused on the human performance (human factors) issues of workload, situational
awareness (SA), and vigilance, all of which are all vitally important characteristics of a
successful, professional airline pilot. The Pilot Proficiency Audit (PPA) acknowledges
their significance through the measurement of CRM, SA, workload management,
decision making, and cockpit discipline.
Of greater importance to this review, however, are the physical manipulation of
aircraft controls in a line environment, the knowledge of policies and procedures as
taught by the air carrier, and the individual personality traits of each observed pilot. It is
in these areas that data is scarce. As stated in a 1997 report, "There is little research in the
commercial aviation domain examining the pilot's overall flight performance in
assessment events like the LOE, maneuver validation and line checks" (Boehm-Davis,
Holt, & Hansberger, 1997, p. 462). Even in those areas that are usually grouped under the
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CRM banner, "The research base for the use of these behaviours is.. .quite thin"
(Beaumont, 1999, p. 1197).
There are studies in other areas that have proven valuable for purposes of this
research. They can be grouped into the following general categories:
1. Background studies in other areas related to pilot performance, and human
performance in general.
2. The design of proven observational and training exercises, including use of
appropriate rating scales, rater-reliability, and other methods and techniques.
3. Surveys that have identified those pilot traits, or KSAs, proven necessary for
success in the industry.
4. Studies that focus on the effects of age and experience on pilot performance,
including analysis of those pilot characteristics commonly identified with
"pilot-error" accidents.
5. Pilot assessment studies carried out by the air carrier in the past. This PPA
measures the performance of a select group of professional individuals, those
employed by one particular air carrier. As such, the only reference material
corresponding exactly to that population are previous performance
assessments done by that air carrier. Those studies are not available to the
public, and as such will not be referenced specifically in this literature review,
but certain aspects of those programs have been researched to assure a more
complete understanding of performance-rating processes previously
undertaken by this air carrier.
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Background Studies
The Human Performance Measures Handbook (Gawron, 2000) was originally
developed to assist researchers in the selection of appropriate measures in the evaluation
of the interaction between humans and machines. Again, the focus is on traditional
human factors, but there are several important investigative aspects relevant to a PPA.
Those issues outlined in the Handbook that are directly applicable to an experimental
study of pilot performance include:
1. Precise definition of the question, description of the independent and
dependent variables, and all experimental conditions.
2. Documentation of "qualifiers", or variables that qualify or restrict the
generalizability of the results.
3. Matching of subjects with real-world, end users.
4. Selection of proper performance measures, which must be relevant, reliable,
valid, quantitative, and comprehensive.
5. Use of a statistically appropriate sample size.
6. Selection of proper data collection and data recording equipment and
processes.

Measurement Characteristics.
Of particular importance is step number 4. The pilot performance measures observed
and recorded in a PPA should be:
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1. Relevant - The KSAs that are the focus of the audit must be the ones that need
to be measured, and those that will provide the greatest potential benefit for
improvements in safety.
2. Reliable - A reliable measurement is one that is repeatable.
If one measures the same behavior in exactly the same way under
identical circumstances, the same value of the metric should result.
In human performance measurement, however, individual
differences among human operators, decision-makers, and
maintainers occur; even the same person may respond to
successive trials differently. (Rehmann, 1995, p. 4)
In the case of observational studies, the observers are the key to reliability,
and for pilot performance audits, inter-rater reliability is essential (this issue is
discussed in detail later in this chapter).
3. Valid - Validity refers to measuring what the study really intends to measure,
and being appropriate to use for the intended purpose. There are five types of
validity usually associated with human performance: face, concurrent,
content, construct, and predictive. For purposes of this PPA, the two most
important are: (a) face validity - subject matter experts (SMEs) determine that
a particular measurement represents the particular pilot performance important
to accomplish the task, and (b) predictive validity - the measures being
observed in the study should be representative and predictive of the pilot's
performance in the real world. Validity in general is closely tied to reliability
(Rehmann, 1995).
4. Quantitative measurements - A quantitative measurement provides an
estimate of the size of the difference between experimental conditions, or in
the case of a PPA, performance observations. Various rating scales can be

employed, including nominal (identifies differences, with no notion of order,
magnitude or size), ordinal (in order, but differences in position not
comparable), interval (equal distances between values), or ratio (possesses a
true zero) (Morrow, Jackson, Disch, & Mood, 1995).
5. Comprehensive - A study that is comprehensive measures all aspects of a
pilot's performance. Observing and recording all possible measurements will
be easier and more efficient than repeating the study at a later date to gather
data that was initially overlooked. Measurements must also gather sufficient
detail to permit a meaningful analysis.
6. Use of a large enough sample size to assure statistically accurate conclusions.
7. Sensitivity - the degree to which a measure will react to changes in the
independent variable. The measure itself can be valid and reliable, but may
not show a large enough effect to be easily measured.
8. Intrusiveness - almost all measures are intrusive to some degree, but the
degree to which they alter the task performance will vary. In the case of a
PPA, the observer, by the very nature of his/her presence on the flight deck,
will create some distraction for the subject. Obviously, for any observational
study, less intrusive methods are preferred (Rehmann, 1995).

Observational and Training Studies
Historically, objective pilot performance measurement has involved the analysis
of deviations from pre-set flight parameter standards (altitude, heading, etc.). These
traditional measures usually take the form of subjective, "expert" ratings made by the
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flight instructor in a very controlled environment (Mclntyre, 1993). More recent
developments in pilot training and checking, however, have created new pilot
performance measurement opportunities.
The Advanced Qualification Program relies on the observations of qualified check
airman in both the LOE and the LOFT in the simulator. While the F/O PPA focuses on
operational factors, not training issues, there are a number of related areas that are
important to the overall study of pilot performance.

Inter-rater Reliability.
As a proficiency-based program, AQP relies on the collection of empirical data to
assess and monitor flight crew performance. As such, the collection and analysis of
quality data is fundamental to the program's success (Holt, Johnson, & Goldsmith, 1997).
Ratings of pilot performance based on observed behavior can only be valid if they
are reliable; that is, there is consistency in the measurement process. Within the AQP,
this consistency is referred to as "inter-rater reliability" and is primarily focused on rater
agreement and observation accuracy. Both can be affected by individual evaluator bias,
by the measurement tool utilized, by the types of event sets and scenarios employed, and
other factors (Baker & Dismukes, 1997). Birnbach and Longridge (1993) noted that
because the variance associated with an unreliable measure can not always be
distinguished from error, a reliable measure may not always be valid, but an unreliable
measure will never be valid. That relationship can be put another way, in that "a valid test
is always reliable, but a reliable test is not always valid" (Gay & Airasian, 2000, p. 170).
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Referent Reliability
This method of examining observer's reliability differs from typical rater
reliability in that crew behavior is compared to a pre-determined standard of
performance, called a "referent," rather than the evaluators group norm. This referent is
sometimes referred to as the "gold standard" for judgements.
Holt, Johnson, & Goldsmith (1997) describe the benefits of using an external
referent:
Using a referent to assess evaluator reliability has three important
implications. First, high referent-rater reliability results in high raterreliability. If evaluators are judging crew behavior in accordance with the
same set of standards, then they will necessarily agree with another.
Second, the distribution of referent scores defines the appropriate
distributional characteristics of evaluator scores. Hence, by training to
match the referent judgements, evaluators can be trained to match the
mean, variance, and skewness of the referent distribution. Third, a major
advantage of referent reliability over inter-rater reliability is that the
problem of an incorrect group norm for judgements is avoided. That is, in
the case where the majority of raters are rating incorrectly, the other raters
will not be trained to the incorrect standard, (p. 917)

Observation Accuracy
Under AQP, a check airman observes what the flight crew says and does during
the LOFT or LOE scenario. Because these observations form the basis for the overall
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crew performance rating, accuracy is critically important. All raters, therefore, must use
the same parameters of "behavioral information" for scoring crews during each event set
(Baker & Dismukes, 1997).
While there is substantial reference material on rater agreement, there has been
little research regarding observation accuracy in terms of pilot performance. One study
(George Mason University, 1996) indicated that raters' average agreement for observed
CRM behavior improved only marginally after calibration training, consisting of
discussion of inconsistent observations.
Factors that can reduce observational accuracy include the type and number of
complex event sets in the scenario, and the fact that the evaluator also has to act as a
simulator operator, scenario facilitator, and instructor. The workload associated with
performance of these duties can reduce the degree to which accurate observations are
made. While the evidence indicates that check airmen acting as evaluators are generally
accurate when observing CRM behavior, effective training strategies have yet to be fully
developed (Baker & Dismukes, 1997).

Rater Agreement
Flight crew performance during an observational PPA is usually documented by
the assignment of a grade based on a pre-determined, defined scale. Inter-rater agreement
is the extent to which various observers (of the same performance) agree concerning the
assigned grade. Several recent studies have shown that raters can achieve reasonable
levels of consistency (Brannick, Prince, Salas, & Prince, 1993).
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Different rating scales and levels of ratings (overall scenario vs. "event set"
ratings) can also affect rater agreement. One recent study concluded that the most reliable
results of a PPA could be produced utilizing event set level observations and grading with
a 5-point scale (Seamster, Edens & Holt, 1995). For a PPA, then:
Check airmen can demonstrate acceptable levels of both inter-rater
agreement and reliability when assessing specific scenario events. In
general, check airmen can agree regarding the level of performance
demonstrated by the crew with respect to a defined scale (i.e., crew
performance was a 3 on a 4-point scale). [However] rater training may
need to include more than discussion to ensure that check airmen are
accurate and calibrated regarding the carrier's LOS [Line Operational
Simulation] rating scales. (Baker & Dismukes, 1997, p. 454)

Observer Training
Typical rater calibration training in the airline industry consists of a one-day
workshop in which the instructors receive required information about the program,
discuss various aspects of the air carrier's rating process, and practice assessing and
rating videotaped LOFTs. The evaluators observe a particular flight crew's taped
performance on a given event set, and then individually rate the crew's performance.
After class review, rating discrepancies are discussed among the group to reach
consensus. A videotape of the same event, but performed by a different crew, is then
rated to determine the group's level of calibration (Baker & Mulqueen, 1999).
A George Mason University study (Williams, Holt, & Boehm-Davis, 1997) rated
the three models of rater training currently used to reduce rater biases and increase
reliability and accuracy. First, and best, was "familiarization with behaviorally-based
scales prior to rating aids schema formation and accurate categorization of performance"
(p. 515). Next, and also important, "frame of reference training (aligning idiosyncratic
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standards of a group of raters with organizational standards by establishing a prior frame
of reference) has been shown to reduce rater error and increase rater accuracy more
effectively than other training approaches" (p. 515). Least effective was the traditional
workshop training method.
Effective pilot instructor/evaluator training (identified as industry "best
practices") as described by the American Institutes for Research (Baker & Mulqueen,
1999) should include:
1. A detailed discussion of the LOE or LOFT scenario, both on the overall and
event set levels.
2. A detailed discussion of the technical and CRM skills to be assessed.
3. A review of the performance standards for each area to be studied, whether
technical or CRM knowledge, skills or abilities.
4. Training to assist raters to be good observers. Discussion should focus on the
nature of a good observation, and how to accurately observe a flight crew's
performance.
5. Opportunities to practice and receive feedback on the rating task. This practice
should include rating videotaped performances of the specific LOE event sets,
over a wide range of crew performance levels (i.e., excellent, good, poor,
etc.).
6. Feedback comparing the pilot rater scores with ratings established by
"baseline", or true experts. This feedback is arguably the most import aspect of
training, and should include:
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(a) The congruency between each observer's distribution of grades
and the group's distribution.
(b) The degree to which each observer's mean performance rating
differs from the group mean.
(c) The degree to which observers are able to shift their
evaluations upward and downward based on improving or
decreasing performance.
(d) The degree to which observers can accurately discriminate
between crews of varying performance levels (Hamman,
Beaubien, & Holt, 1999).

Critical Incident Technique
This technique outlines a general set of specifications for observational studies,
most of which are appropriate to a PPA. Initially formulated in 1947, the requirements
are grouped into three categories: observers, groups being observed, and the behaviors to
be observed.
1. Observers - Persons doing the observing must be knowledgeable regarding
the activity, they must have some relation (personal, professional, etc.) to
those being observed, and there must be specific training requirements in
order to adequately do the observing.
2. Groups to be observed - The study documentation must include a general
description of the group, the location, times, and conditions of the planned
observations.
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3. Behaviors to be observed - Emphasis should be placed on the general type of
activity, specific behaviors targeted for observation, and the criteria of the
specific behavior that is of relevance and importance to the general aim of the
study (Gawron, 2000).

Performance Measurement Instrument
Various performance measurement recording tools have been used over the years,
with the Pilot Performance Description Report (PPDR) used by Prophet & Jolley (1969)
one of the first. In this instrument, ratings are anchored to specific performance standards,
allowing an observer to record desired elements of performance. It also contains a
subjective rating scale that allows an evaluator to utilize his/her experience in assessing
aviator performance. Numerous studies since that time, including performance
investigations by Childs, Spears, and Prophet in 1983, and Kaempf and Blackwell in
1990, have utilized similar tools (Kaempf & Klinger, 1993). All of these studies have
demonstrated that proficiency ratings with descriptive scales are more reliable than
ratings made without them.
The Pilot Performance Index (PPI) was developed with the aid of subject matter
experts (Stein, 1984, p. 20). Essentially, the PPI is a list of performance variables and
associated performance criteria that specifically differentiates novice from experienced
pilots. Many of the performance variables are directly applicable to the operation of
modern transport category, including pitch angle on takeoff, airspeeds, headings, and
bank angles. Other variables, such as "course deviation indicator, " "omni bearing
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sensor," and "manifold pressure" are more appropriate for a very generalized pilot
population flying less sophisticated aircraft.

Table 2
Pilot Performance Index Variable List
Takeoff

Climb

Enroute

Descent

Approach

Final Approach

Pitch angle

Heading

Altitude

Heading

Heading

Heading

Airspeed

Pitch angle

Airspeed

Manifold left

Gear position

Heading

Bank angle

Manifold right

Flap position

Course deviation
indicator

Course deviation
indicator

Bank angle

Course
deviation
indicator

Omni bearing
selector

Omni bearing
selector

Kaempf & Klinger's (1993) Performance Measurement Instrument (PMI) enables
observers to document and assess aviator proficiency within the context of specific tasks
and conditions. With this tool, pilots are graded in four major flight tasks, loosely
grouped as Takeoff, Enroute, Category II (CAT II) Instrument Landing System (ILS)
Approach, and Missed Approach, with 79 individual performance elements. In order to
be sensitive to various levels of proficiency, but still provide a means for the observer to
document unsatisfactory performance, a six point rating scale was developed, with the
following verbal anchors: unsatisfactory, acceptable, below average, average, above
average, and expert.
Evaluations of the PMI indicate that trained observers can reliably recognize and
record specific elements of pilot performance, and can apply the performance rating
scales reliably as well. However, a lack of practice with the PMI, observation of both

crewmembers, and difficulty determining the individual pilot contribution to the team
performance can produce an undesirable lack of standardization between observers.

Event Set
An event set is a group of related flight events which are inserted into a LOFT or
LOE scenario for specific training objectives. The set is usually made up of an event
trigger (condition that activates the set), distracters (conditions inserted designed to divert
the crew's attention), and supporting events (other events that serve to reinforce the
training objectives) (Hamman, Seamster, & Edens, 1995). And while it is understood that
the use of appropriate event sets provides the most effective rater training and
observational reliability (Seamster, Edens, & Holt, 1995), the LOFT and LOE are
training exercises only, and take place in a simulated environment. However, evaluations
of line pilot performance could benefit from similar grouping of flight maneuvers into
event sets, on both the grading forms and during observer training.

Observational Worksheet
As utilized in the AQP, the evaluator7s worksheet is a primary tool for assessing
pilot performance. There are a number of features incorporated into the worksheet that
serve to improve the overall rating reliability, including:
1. Assessment areas based on event sets, usually subdivided into areas such as
flight operations considerations, human performance, situational awareness,
and specific maneuvers. "Ratings based on LOE event sets are less
confounded by inflation or leniency errors leading to a more reliable

performance assessment" (Seamster, Edens, & Holt, 1995, p. 613).
Observation forms used in a recent study (Ikomi, Boehm-Davis, Holt, &
Incalcaterra, 1999) were divided into four major areas: Experience and
training questions, flight departure phase events, flight cruise phase events,
and flight arrival phase events, thus targeting those specific areas of interest in
the study.
2. Similarity between the LOE and the air carrier's line check forms, and in the
use of a common rating scale. Familiarity with a common form leads to fewer
observer recording errors, and a standard scale used across the full range of air
carrier evaluation environments allows the instructors/evaluators to develop
pilot performance rating skills based on a consistent set of crew performance
standards (Schultz, Seamster, & Edens, 1997).

Knowledge, Skills and Abilities
A common methodology used in personnel research has been the assignment of
numerical grades to various categories of human performance. While many grading
scales and formats have been used, the selection of appropriate behaviors to observe and
grade is critical. It has been noted that it is important that rigorous behavior selections
and behaviorally anchored procedures be used in the development of rating scales,
regardless of the particular grading format to be used (Landy & Farr, 1980).
Development of appropriate behaviorally- anchored rating scales (BARS) requires
the use of just such rigorous procedures. These scales were first proposed in 1954 as an
outgrowth of the critical incident technique previously discussed. A recent joint effort of

31
FlightSafety International and US Airways Express (Bramble, 1997) initially considered
96 job behaviors and 12 broad performance categories as critical in future air carrier
pilots. Further research, primarily interviews with pilots and airline management,
identified 32 behaviors as "anchors" for nine fundamental behavior scales. Those
included: (a) professionalism, (b) awareness, (c) responsibility/initiative, (d) flying skills,
(e) communication, (f) judgement/decision making, (g) interactions with passengers, and
(h) interactions with flight attendants. While the usefulness of this particular F/O BARS
needs further validation, FlightSafety plans to use the scales as a criterion measure in a
future pilot selection study.
A later predictive study evaluated general ability, conscientiousness, and stability
as predictors of regional airline pilot performance (Bramble, 1998). Job performance was
assessed utilizing the nine fundamental BARS scales noted above, resulting in the
generation of both "proficiency" and "interpersonal" factors.
A recent study (Jentsch, Bowers, Martin, Barnett, & Prince, 1997) was conducted
to identify training needs for those new F/Os about to begin their pilot-not-flying (PNF)
duties. Interviews with F/Os, as well as a review of the NASA ASRS, indicated that there
is a tendency for F/Os not to adequately monitor and challenge the Captain (one-half of
total incidents recorded), while procedural errors accounted for only one-quarter of the
errors. The three primary categories of operational errors were: (a) failure to monitor; (b)
identification of a problem but choosing not to initiate action; and (c) identification of a
problem, recognition of a need to initiate action, but not doing so due to apprehension.
During the interview phase of the study, it was documented that a "good" F/O was one
who was knowledgeable, demonstrated initiative, was interactive, willing to

communicate, loved flying, had a sense of humor, and presented an overall clean personal
appearance.

The Effect of Age and Experience on Performance
For the purposes of a PPA, it would be valuable to know the negative effects (if
any) of aging, and the positive effects (again, if any) of flying experience, on both simple
flight skills and more complex cognitive tasks. Because of the controversy surrounding
the current age-60 retirement rule for U.S. airline pilots, much research has been focused
on analyzing the effects of aging on the pilot population, and other studies have focused
on experience.
Very recent data has shown that there is a definite correlation between age and
specific performance measures. In one study, 100 civilian pilot volunteers age 50 to 69
performed aviation-related tasks in a Frasca flight simulator. Performance indices
included staying on course, dialing frequencies, avoiding conflicting traffic, and flying an
instrument approach. Nine composite scores were recorded in working memory, visual
associative memory, motor coordination, tracking, numerical operations, visual scanning,
spatial processing and attribute identification. It was found that pilot age "was
significantly correlated with 7 of the 9 factors . . . [with] none of the age relations
favoring older pilots" (Taylor, O'Hara, Mumenthaller, & Yesavage, 2000, p. 376).
Specific time-sharing task performance measurements, such as maintaining
aircraft stability while navigating, were studied in research conducted several years ago
(Tsang, 1995). Of particular interest are those trials that focused on the detrimental
effects of aging, and the fact that increased flight experience can mitigate to a limited
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degree minor age-related degradation. Experience levels were the sole variable in studies
conducted through the U.S. Air Force (Carretta, Perry, & Ree, 1995). They demonstrated
that flight experience and situational awareness were directly related; the more
experience a pilot had, the better the individual situational awareness was predicted to be.

Pilot Error
Another aspect of pilot performance related to age and experience is decision
making under high workload. Accidents and incidents caused by operational or
behavioral acts of pilots have traditionally been classified as "pilot error." Review of the
National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's) records shows that pilot error was a
factor in 38% of all air carrier (CFR Part 121) accidents, 75% of all air taxi accidents
(CFR Part 135), and 85% of general aviation (CFR Part 91) accidents for the period
1978-1990 (NTSB, 1994).
A comprehensive review of this data was conducted in 2000 (Li, Baker,
Grabowski, Jurek, & Rebok, 2001). That analysis identified certain characteristics of the
pilot-in-command and crash circumstances in those accidents attributed to pilot error.
Importantly, "Age-related variation in the prevalence rates of pilot error was statistically
insignificant for major airline crashes . . . [and] total flight time showed an effect on pilot
error only in general aviation crashes" (p. 54). While age and experience play an
important role at the extreme ends of the scales (very young or aged, novice or seasoned
professional), specifically in the general aviation environment, they are generally not
factors in air carrier operations.
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Previous Air Carrier Pilot Performance Assessments
The subject air carrier had conducted five flight safety audits between 1976 and
1997. The methodology for each of the audits had been the same; paid volunteers were
selected from company management pilots and t he line pilot ranks to observe cockpit
operations during scheduled line flights. The willing participation and cooperation of the
pilots' union had been critical to the success of each audit, and the union's safety
representatives contributed substantially to the success of the observational teams. There
was no planned method to gather parametric data during any of the five audits; thus no
attempt had been made to train (calibrate) the observers, or to assure consistency of the
reported findings. Very little, if any, comparative analysis was performed on the results
generated from the various audits, or the resultant findings and recommendations.
The aforementioned data gathering method has persisted as a problem in current
safety audits of air carrier flight operations. In addition to addressing the need for
parametric data, this researcher decided that the pilot performance areas of focus
suggested by the earlier audits should include:
1. Knowledge - Flight Operations Manual, logbook, minimum equipment list
(MEL), dispatch procedures, weather review, company communications,
cockpit discipline and sterile cockpit, and general operating procedures.
2. Skills - Briefings, stabilized approach conformance, preflights, and checklist
usage.
3. Abilities - Personal appearance, morale, command ability, attitude, and
complacency.
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All previous audits had been crew-oriented, rather than individual-pilot-oriented,
and all reports had been completely de-identified. No demographic data was available
concerning crew experience, company longevity, age, total flight time, or type of aircraft.
Despite the absence of previous audits' parametric data relevant to this study, the flight
crews' familiarity with the auditing processes and the trust instilled by the previous
"anonymous" audits tended to enhance the reliability of the data to be gathered during a
PPA.

CHAPTER HI
METHODS AND PROCEDURES

In early 2001, the safety department of a U.S. air carrier desired to determine the
level of operational proficiency among its F/Os. There were a number of factors involved
in the decision to obtain accurate pilot proficiency data:
1. The airline had recently been involved in a merger, and the labor integration
issues provided ample opportunity for pilot distraction and error.
2. The airline had recently experienced a high turnover rate among its first
officers. More than one-half of the 2,000 pilots hired in the previous 7 years
had resigned to accept positions with other air carriers, significantly reducing
the average experience levels of the remaining pilot workforce.
3. Reports from line check airmen indicated a possible downward trend in first
officer operational knowledge, proficiency, and attitude.
4. The airline had only recently completed development of an Internal
Evaluation Program (IEP). Exercising the processes and personnel within the
IEP could provide beneficial feedback to the embryonic program.
5. There was the potential to compare the data obtained via the airline's other
safety programs (FOQA, AQP, and LOSA, with ASAP under development)
with the F/O proposed PPA data for a broader understanding of particular
operational safety issues.
36
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6. Finally, there was a traditional aspect of safety that relates to "communication
and visibility." Line pilots needed to know that the airline's safety
professionals are interested and involved in the day-to-day operations, and
that there was a reliable mechanism for timely exchange of information. Line
qualified auditors interacting with flight crews over a period of at least several
weeks would reinforce both of these safety program characteristics.
The air carrier's executive management approved the development and execution of a
pilot proficiency audit, to start on June 1, 2001, and continue for a period of 30 days.

The Pilot Proficiency Audit (PPA)
All air carriers have extensive experience with self-audits, whether in an
individual sense (i.e., a check airman rating a particular pilot's abilities), or in an industry
sense, where observers of varied backgrounds scrutinize many different aspects of an
airline's operations (typically a LOSA). A non-traditional F/O PPA could record many of
the same parameters, but measuring additional variables of the F/O population would
allow the use of correlational techniques not previously considered.
The independent variables of date of hire, age, total flight time, total airline time,
and total time in current position were determined to be those that would provide the
greatest insight for the study. These variables were available though the host airline's
pilot qualification computer-based tracking system, and were considered independent and
reliable.
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Subjects
All F/Os of the airline were subject to observation; in the observational flight
selection process, no distinction was made regarding fleet (aircraft) type, or operation
(domestic vs. international). Personal information was downloaded before the flight was
started, but no record was kept of the pilot's name or company identification number.

Evaluation Procedure
The F/O PPA was conducted in a manner very similar to traditional airline
observational studies, i.e. LOSA and LOE. Observers accompanied flight crews on
regularly scheduled flights, participating in all phases of the trip, from preflight planning
and crew briefings through the final cockpit "end-of-flight" checklist. Most flight crews
were familiar with this format from operational safety audits conducted by the airline in
previous years. All observations were recorded on an evaluation form, similar in layout
and content to the line check airman report form.
All of the air carrier's flights were subject to auditing. One, two, three and four
day flight sequences were included, based on the individual observer's schedule. Both
international and domestic operations were selected, as were flights on all four types of
aircraft operated by the carrier. Although the observers started and finished their
sequences at only one of the carrier's "hubs," F/Os from all of the airline's crew bases
were included in the study.
Observers developed their own schedules, and flights were selected as randomly
as possible. However, two other factors were taken into consideration:
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1. Both very long and very short flight segments (total flight time) were
observed, but obtaining as large a sample size as possible weighted the
selection towards shorter flights.
2. If a F/O had already been audited by one observer, then that observer would
attempt to not schedule a flight flown by that particular F/O again.

The PPA was not voluntary; a F/O could not refuse the observer access to the
cockpit jumpseat. However, all subjects were assured that the study was completely
confidential, that no names would be associated with any reports, and that any
information used within the airline's safety program would be further de-identified
regarding date and flight number.
Interviews were conducted with the subject F/Os while in cruise flight, when
workload permitted. Typically they consisted of discussions regarding the airline's
Operations Specifications, operational policies and procedures, aircraft systems, and
performance calculations. The same questions were raised with each F/O. Conversely, the
observers encouraged comments and suggestions from the flight crews, all of which were
recorded and returned to the Safety Department. The essential elements of these remarks
can be found in the Qualitative Data section of Chapter IV.
For a typical correlational study, a sample size of 30 subjects is usually
considered accurate (Gay & Airasian, 2000). Although the validity and reliability of the
study were believed to be high, a larger sample size would improve the overall results.
Working within the constrains of the pilot (observer) contract, it was estimated that each

observer could record two flights on each of the 17 days worked, for a planned total of 68
observations.

Observers
Two observers were selected from a pool of qualified check airmen. One was a
current and qualified Captain; the other had recently retired his position as a line Captain.
Cumulatively, they had amassed more than 74 years of line operations, and
approximately 55,000 hours of flight time, in both narrow and wide body transport
category aircraft. Both were qualified as line and simulator instructors, were very familiar
with the line check airman grading form and procedures, and had completed extensive
AQP initial and recurrent training within the previous 2 years. That training consisted of
several video tape sessions, group grading, and group discussion to resolve differences,
as described in recent industry reports (Baker & Mulqueen, 1999; Williams, Holt, &
Boehm-Davis, 1997).
Prior to initiating the audit, three training sessions were held with the two
observers and safety department personnel. Discussions during those meetings centered
on the purpose of the study, the methods and the forms to be used, development of
techniques that would prove helpful, and verification of inter-rater reliability. Limiting
the total number of observers to two assured a high level of agreement regarding
performance ratings, particularly given the two individuals' extensive AQP training and
experience.
Several issues that could impact the success of accurate observations were
discussed:
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1. Previous studies have shown that the presence of another person in an air
carrier cockpit during routine flight operations can be distracting to the point
of disrupting a normal operation. It is known as "intrusiveness," and is
especially true if there is the perception that a check ride is being conducted. It
was extremely important that every effort was made to minimize any altered
flight crew behavior due to the observer's presence. As a result, techniques
were developed to put the subject F/Os at ease.
2. The behavior of one person in a flight crew can influence the behavior of the
other. Since the focus of the PPA was the F/O, the observers were very
cognizant of the effect certain Captain personalities (domineering, reticent,
etc.) might have on the performance of the F/O, and developed strategies to
minimize the effect on the ratings.
3. It was discussed and understood that personal biases of the observers, whether
personal or professional, must not be allowed to affect the study. If necessary,
an observer would excuse himself from a particular flight; however, all flights
scheduled were completed during the PPA.

The observers were instrumental in developing interview questions, and in
defining the scope of F/O knowledge, skills, and abilities to be graded. These preliminary
meetings were also critical in satisfying the three Critical Incident Technique
specifications for observers, subjects to be observed, and behaviors to be observed.
After two observational flights each, the observer's preliminary results were
analyzed and discussed. In a meeting dedicated to the study's refinement, very minor

changes (for clarity) were made to the rating form, and items relating to the types of
knowledge-based material to discuss with F/Os were reviewed and modified slightly. As
a small-scale field study, this early exercise allowed limited refinement of the process and
verification of the procedures. The exercise also verified the consistency of rater
agreement necessary for a F/O performance study. Finally, the short field study also
allowed completion of the audit within the 30-day time frame and the budget.

Instrument
The "First Officer Evaluation Form" (as reproduced in the Appendix) is very
similar to the "Line Evaluation" form used by the same air carrier, and familiar to all
instructors, line check airmen and observers. There are eight sections: (a) trip planning;
(b) pre-takeoff; (c) takeoff and departure; (d) climb, enroute, and descent; (e) approach
and landing; (f) post landing; (g) general; and (h) command ability/CRM. Each of these
sections had a number of specific areas to be graded.
Of the total of 74 entries that were graded, 26 were considered "knowledge," 38
were considered "skills," and 9 were "abilities." The 74th entry was for an "overall"
score, which was used as a reference to record the observer's overall evaluation versus a
graded, or averaged, score for the same flight. The division of entries into one of the three
KSA areas was intuitive to this researcher; any item that required acquiring a specific
knowledge of a subject, as taught by the air carrier, was considered "knowledge." An
item that required demonstration of a particular learned physical skill, such as
manipulation of flight controls, was considered "skills." Any personal attribute brought
into the air carrier employment environment (not learned) was considered an "ability."
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For those items where a combination of attributes were present (i.e. cockpit/cabin
briefing, where the knowledge of what the briefing should contain is combined with the
skill of delivery) the particular KSA aspect deemed most important to successfully
completing the item was selected as primary.
Many of the items on the First Officer Evaluation Form are the same as those on
the line check form, and other items were added or deleted only after a thorough review
of the issues and topics necessary to successfully complete the audit. To assure face
validity, this task was completed by four SMEs: (a) the Corporate Vice President of
Safety; (b) the Director of Flight Safety; and (c) the two check airmen (observers) of the
subject airline. Since the observations were to be made in the "real-world" environment,
predictive validity was assumed to be very high. A complete breakdown of each section
can be found in Table 3, Chapter IV. The list was deemed to be comprehensive by the
inclusion of a varied selection of items from each of the three areas to be studied: F/O
knowledge, F/O skills, and F/O abilities.
Seven specific items were later decided to be of little use to the PPA, due to a lack
of observation during routine flight operations and resultant missing values. Those
omitted were (a) international planning, (b) rejected takeoffs, (c) international navigation,
(d) holding patterns, (e) monitored approach procedures, (f) non-precision approaches,
and (g) autoflight approach procedures. These items exist on the rating form, were graded
during a few of the observational flights, and can be found in the final database.
However, they have not been included in any of the calculations upon which the final
data analysis has been based.
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Likert Scale
Grading of F/O performance was designed to be quantitative, utilizing the fivepoint Likert scale. What each observer was looking for, however, was standardization. A
" 1 " indicated a performance well below standard; a "5" indicated a performance well
above standard. A grade of "3" represented a "standard" F/O, that is, one that performed
his/her duties as trained. If rated a 3, the F/O's knowledge base was that required by the
air carrier (to a level expected from the training given). It was not expected that many 1
or 5 grades would be recorded; results were in accordance with the expectations.
The referent in this case was the absolute "standard" as expected by the air
carrier. Grading to the referent is much more consistent than grading to an "average"
performance level. The extensive line check experience of the observers enabled
consistent grading to the standard on a continuous, interval scale, throughout the PPA.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF DATA

After 30 days of observational flights, the final quantitative data set totaled 64
cases, each case consisting of 6 independent variables and 74 dependent variables. A data
base was constructed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 10.1.0)
on a personal computer. Five of the independent variables - years of service, age, total
flight time, total airline flight time, and total time in current position - are SPSS scale
variables. The sixth variable, aircraft type, is an SPSS nominal variable. All data analysis
was completed with the SPSS.
Due to the nature of the study, not all graded events occurred during each one of
the observational flights, resulting in missing values in the final data set. This researcher
decided that at least 15 observations were required for valid analysis; of the 74 entries, 7
were discarded due to the inability of the observers to gather the required number of
observations. The remaining 67 entries were separated into appropriate categories of
knowledge, skills, and abilities (see Chapter III for a complete discussion). Table 3,
below, subdivides each of the individual variables into the appropriate KSA category.
The complete and final version of the grading form used by the observers can be found in
the Appendix to this report.
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Table 3
Rating Form Graded Entries: Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities
Knowledge

Skills

Weather review

Computer flight plan

Dispatch procedures

Weight & balance

MEL

Weather radar

Fuel management

Optimum cruise speeds
/ altitudes
Diversion / alternate

FMS / enroute navigation

Descent planning

Speed / altitude
restrictions

Knowledge of minimums /
ops spex

Approach planning /
briefing

Landing charts

Terminal speeds / altitudes

Approach nav setup

Use of autoflight
systems

Logbook, maintenance

Equipment knowledge

FOPM knowledge

Procedures, policies

Company
communications

Cockpit discipline

Cockpit / cabin briefing

Walkaround

Preflight (cockpit)

ATIS, clearance

Departure nav setup

Engine start, powerback

Ramp congestion

Engine out taxi

Taxi procedures (out)

Takeoff performance

Takeoff briefing

Takeoff alert

Normal takeoff

Crosswind takeoff

Minimum speeds, bank
angles
Climb & descent speed
control
Speed control / stabilized
approach
Threshold clearance height

SID, departure
procedures
Autopilot use
Slot / line up recognition

Noise abatement
procedures
Transition level /
altitude
Precision / manual
approach
Go around readiness

Normal landing

Crosswind landing

Taxi procedures (in)

Engine out taxi

Smoothness, precision of
flight

Checklist usage

Attitude

Safety awareness

Professionalism

Personal appearance

Situational awareness

Workload management

Decision making

Cockpit discipline /
sterile cockpit

CRM

Use of spoilers, reverse,
brakes
Secure cockpit check
Traffic lookout
Abilities
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Demographics
The 64 cases represent 64 observational flights, but only 61 individual F/Os. Two
F/Os were observed once by each observer, and one F/O was observed twice by the same
observer. The mean KSA scores and total mean scores for the graded performance of the
first two F/Os are shown in Table 4. Note the very close correlation of scores as recorded
by the two observers during these four observational flights. Descriptive statistics of all
of the independent variables for the complete study are shown in Table 5. The sample
size of 64 provided sufficient statistical power for this study.
Table 4
Mean KSA Scores for Duplicated Observations of Two F/Os.

F/O A
F/OB

Observer #1
Observer #2
Observer #1
Observer #2

Mean
Mean
knowledge Mean skills abilities
2.90
3.00
2.75
2.91
2.97
2.75
2.94
2.95
2.63
2.94
3.00
2.63

Total mean
2.93
2.90
2.89
2.90

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

Years of service
Age (years)
Total flight time
(hours)
Airline flight time
(hours)
Total flight time in
current position

N
64
64

Minimum Maximum
.31
12.65
28.00
59.00

Mean
4.15
37.31

SD
3.50
6.33

62

2424.00

12023.00

6372.10

2373.74

64

79.00

8061.00

2312.55

1808.15

64

38.00

2943.00

1003.13

574.94
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It should be noted that of the five independent, numeric variables, only "Total
time" approaches a normal distribution. This is to be expected, as it is the only variable
that includes data brought from outside the immediate environment (flying time recorded
prior to being hired by the airline). Plotting the data for the remaining four independent
variables resulted in positively skewed distributions, for the following reasons:
1. Airline pilot hiring tendencies are toward younger applicants (age), but
occasionally older pilots are accepted for initial employment.
2. F/Os usually, but not always, upgrade to Captain when the opportunity exists
(years of service).
3. Overall flight experience within the airline depends almost entirely upon years
of service (total airline flight time).
4. Length of service on a particular aircraft is dependent on the staffing
requirements of the airline, the working conditions preferred by an individual
pilot, and the phasing in and out of various fleet types by the operator (total
time in current position).
A survey of the entire F/O population of an air carrier would probably not yield "normal"
distributions for the five independent variables. This study's sample, however, was
representative of the subject air carriers F/Os.

Rating Form Entries
All 64 cases were assigned an "overall" score by each observer. To validate this
score (the observer's general impression of the flight), all scores for each individual case
were averaged, and then compared to the overall score. Additionally, all scores
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considered "knowledge", those considered "skills", and those considered "abilities" were
averaged as well. The results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics, Overall Scores and Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Scores

N
Observer's overall
score
Total mean score
All knowledge items
All skills items
All abilities items

Minimum Maximum

Mean

SD

64

2.00

5.00

3.08

.48

64
1243
1654
493

2.70
1.00
2.00
2.00

3.24
5.00
5.00
5.00

2.96
2.92
2.98
3.15

.12
.38
.28
.55

The range of "observer's overall" scores is high (with a corresponding high
standard deviation, or SD) and its mean (3.08) is somewhat higher than the "total mean"
score (2.96). The inference is that the observer's overall impression of a flight was
somewhat better than the sum of the scores on individual items would indicate. Plotting
either the observer's overall score or total mean score against any of the independent
variables produced a flat linear regression line for all cases, indicating no trend in overall
scores over time-based independent variables.
As can be seen by the small SD values, the mean scores for each category (KSA)
are tightly grouped around the mean. "All abilities" has the largest range, due to the
influence of individual personalities and the difficulty of implementing successful
corporate standardization of attitude, professionalism, and personal appearance. "All
skills" has the lowest range and SD, probably due to the emphasis on flying
maneuvers/skills as taught by the airline and as practiced daily by line pilots. Figures 1
and 2 plot the mean scores for all categories and the various distributions of each is
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evident. Note also the linear regressions, which will be considered shortly; knowledge is
basically flat, or declines slightly over time; skills basically rises slightly over time, and
abilities declines noticeably over time.
Each individual knowledge, skills, and abilities item was extracted from the
overall case data and descriptive statistics generated. Table 7 displays the results for all of
the knowledge items, sorted in ascending order of means for easier recognition of those
areas found to be below standard. Tables 8 and 9 contain the same results for the skills
and abilities items, respectively.
For the safety professional, the areas of highest interest are those that encompass
the broadest area of knowledge, have a high number of observations (N), and are located
near the top or bottom of the table (corresponding to either a high or low relative mean
score). Low scores can possibly indicate poor hiring practices, or inadequate or
inappropriate training; high scores may serve as models for desirable training techniques
in other areas.
Items of specific interest in each category (KSA) were analyzed for possible
relationships with the five numeric independent variables (years of service, age, total
flight time, airline flight time, and flight time in current position). The particular items
chosen were:
1. Knowledge - procedures/policies, equipment knowledge, and cockpit
discipline: These three items are ideally representative of the types of
knowledge taught at the air carrier; they are located at the top, middle, and
bottom of the descriptive statistics table.
2. Skills - use of reverse thrust/brakes, crosswind landing, and normal landing:

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics, Knowledge Items

Landing charts
Procedures/policies
Diversion/alternate
Flight policy Manual
Co. communications
Weather review
Equipment knowledge
Optimum
speeds/altitudes
Ops spex, minimums
Approach plan/brief
Use of autoflight
systems
Dispatch procedures
Fuel management
Descent planning
Speed/alt restrictions
Terminal
speeds/altitudes
Approach nav setup
Logbook, maintenance
Weight & balance
Weather radar
FMS/enroute
navigation
Cockpit discipline
Computer flight plan
MEL

N
39
63
27
62
64
62
64

Minimum Maximum
1.00
5.00
2.00
4.00
1.00
4.00
2.00
4.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
4.00
2.00
4.00

Mean
2.51
2.57
2.63
2.65
2.88
2.90
2.92

SD
.85
.59
.74
.55
.33
.39
.48

47

2.00

4.00

2.94

.32

59
48

2.00
2.00

4.00
4.00

2.95
2.96

.39
.29

44

2.00

3.00

2.98

.15

63
46
46
45

2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00

3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00

2.98
3.00
3.00
3.00

.13
.00
.00
.00

45

3.00

3.00

3.00

.00

47
64
61
46

3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00

3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00

3.00
3.02
3.02
3.02

.00
.13
.13
.15

45

3.00

4.00

3.02

.15

64
62
34

2.00
3.00
3.00

4.00
4.00
4.00

3.03
3.03
3.06

.53
.18
.24

Table 8
Descriptive Statistics, Skills Items
Cockpit/Cabin briefing
Traffic lookout
Takeoff briefing
Checklist usage
Transition level/alt
Use of spoilers, rev, brakes
Autopilot use
Takeoff alert
Takeoff performance
Speed, sink, stab. app.
Smoothness precision
Departure nav setup
Engine start, powerback
Engine out taxi
Taxi procedures
Noise abatement proc.
Min speeds, bank angles
SIDs, depart proc.
Climb & descent speeds
Precision / manual app
Threshold clearance height
Taxi procedures
Engine out taxi
Secure cockpit
ATIS, clearance, etc.
Ramp congestion
Slot / line up recognition
Go-around readiness
Preflight (cockpit)
Normal takeoff
Crosswind landing
Walkaround
Crosswind takeoff
Normal landing

N
50
64
50
64
61
43
47
61
61
45
39
50
56
45
40
46
46
46
45
46
45
39
42
64
64
58
46
46
63
46
17
59
19
45

Minimum Maximum
4.00
2.00
2.00
5.00
2.00
5.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
4.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
4.00
2.00
4.00
4.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
2.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00

Mean
2.74
2.75
2.82
2.84
2.89
2.93
2.98
2.98
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.02
3.02
3.02
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.06
3.08
3.11
3.11

SD
.53
.71
.60
.37
.32
.34
.15
.13
.18
.43
.32
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.21
.00
.00
.00
.00
.13
.13
.15
.26
.18
.21
.24
.28
.32
.32

Table 9
Descriptive Statistics, Abilities Items

Situational awareness
Workload management
CRM
Decision making
Safety awareness
Personal appearance
Attitude
Professionalism

N
64
64
47
64
64
63
64
63

Minimum Maximum
4.00
2.00
4.00
3.00
5.00
2.00
5.00
3.00
2.00
4.00
2.00
4.00
5.00
2.00
4.00
2.00

Mean
2.98
3.03
3.11
3.11
3.11
3.16
3.31
3.35

SD
.28
.18
.60
.36
.65
.57
.77
.65

There are several other items located at the top of the skills ascending means
table (e.g. briefings, traffic lookout) but the items selected are more typical of
the types of physical flying skills of greater interest in this study.
3. Abilities - CRM, attitude, professionalism: CRM was selected because of the
emphasis placed on it during F/O initial and recurrent training, while attitude
and professionalism both scored high, had high SDs and are typical of the
abilities of interest to the PPA.

Knowledge
The "all knowledge items" mean score of 2.92 is markedly below standard. Each
case mean knowledge score was plotted as a linear regression against the five
independent numeric variables. (A linear curve estimation model was selected for
simplicity). The results are similar in each case. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the
mean knowledge trend lines start below standard and display either no improvement, or
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decrease as a function of both years of service and total airline flight time. The start of the
regression line (below standard) and its lack of rise over either years of service or total
airline flight time indicates that the knowledge-based material was not taught adequately
in initial training and has not been learned during subsequent time with the air carrier.
The items chosen for additional scrutiny - policies/procedures, equipment
knowledge, and cockpit discipline - are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, relative to years of
service and flight time in current position. The regression lines for these items are typical
of most knowledge items - starting at or slightly below standard, and either remaining
flat or declining slightly over time. These particular items reinforce the trend lines
discovered previously in the knowledge mean scores.
Of the 24 knowledge items, 40% of the resultant regression lines start at a point
below standard. All trend lines decrease over time, to varying degrees. Interestingly,
however, a few variables demonstrate tendencies that do not follow this norm. The
regression lines for both equipment knowledge and Flight Policy Manual knowledge rise
slightly when plotted against age. These plots do not correlate with the rest of the data,
and therefore may be insignificant. However, one possible explanation for this atypical
performance may be the increasing maturity of the subjects (with age) and subsequent
study habits/motivation to learn.

Skills
The "all skills items" mean score of 2.95 is slightly below standard. Each case
mean skills score was compared to the five independent numeric variables considered
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previously, and a linear regression generated. The results are virtually identical - the
regression line starts slightly below standard and rises to standard or above in all cases.
The implication for skills is that initial training is good, producing a product very close to
the standard. As one would expect, gaining flying experience with the air carrier
increases the skill level of the pilot, either in terms of years of service or in time in
current position.
The three areas of skills interests - use of reverse thrust/brakes, crosswind
landing, and normal landing - are diagramed in Figures 5 and 6, plotted against years of
service and total time in current position. They are typical of most of the skills graded
events; the regression line in both charts follows the general pattern established by the
mean skills scores, starting slightly below, or at standard, and rising over time.

Abilities
The "all abilities" mean score of 3.15 is well above standard. Each case mean
abilities score was compared to the five independent numeric variables considered
previously, and a linear regression performed. Four of the five (years in service, age, total
time, and total airline flight time) are virtually identical, with regression lines that start
well above standard and decrease over time. One (time in current position), however, is
almost flat.
The implications raised by the descending trend lines are serious; the personal
attributes of pilots when hired (attitude, professionalism, personal appearance, etc.) are
scored as very high, but decrease markedly over time, whether measured as years of
service or total airline flight time.
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Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the abilities areas of interest - CRM, attitude, and
Professionalism - plotted against years of service and total airline flight time. Note that
while all scores start above standard, all decrease over time to a point at or below
standard, in a manner very similar to the abilities mean scores previously diagrammed.

Probationary Pilot Scores
Traditionally, air carriers use the first year of pilot employment as a probationary
period. During that time, probationary pilot performance is continually monitored by
management personnel, and a line operational checkride must be completed successfully
prior to the pilot being offered permanent employment status.
Two important pre-employment considerations to an air carrier are age (years of
service remaining to the carrier) and total flight time (experience brought to the job). Of
particular interest to this study, therefore, are probationary pilot's mean scores and total
mean scores in relation to age and total flight time. A total of 11 probationary F/Os were
observed during the PPA; the descriptive statistics are contained in Table 10.
Comparing the total mean and KSA mean scores to those of the overall PPA study
(Table 6) shows similar, though not identical mean scores. Interestingly, however, the
SDs for all three KSA categories are much lower (.07 vs. .38, .14 vs. .28, and .26 vs. .55).
The lower SDs could be the result of a smaller sample group, or it could be that the
variations in pilot performance are much less after initial training than found in the total
study group.
Figures 9 and 10 chart the same mean values (KSAs) against the independent
variables of age and total flight time. Linear regressions were not used in these cases; a
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics, Probationary Pilots Mean Scores

Mean knowledge
Mean skills
Mean abilities
Total mean

N
11
11
11
11

Minimum Maximum
2.83
3.05
2.70
3.16
2.88
3.57
2.81
3.16

Mean
2.93
2.91
3.24
2.98

SD
.07
.14
.26
.11

quadratic curve estimation model, while more complex, provides a better understanding
of the overall trend. Assuming that mean performance scores aren't measurably affected
during the first year of service with an air carrier, the data suggests that there may be
performance patterns based substantially on qualities brought into the work environment.
Specifically, all three categories (KSAs) trend upward with age (i.e., the older the new
hire pilot is, the better he/she may be expected to perform during his/her first year).
Additionally, all three categories (KSAs) tend to reach a peak in performance at about
7,000 hours of flight time (perhaps indicating an "ideal" total flight time for new hire
pilots).
The sample size in this particular analysis (N = 11) is very small, and no attempt
has been made to determine if there is a significant difference between the means at a
given probability level (t test or ANOVA). Thus, the level of confidence in any specific
implication or regression may not be high; however, in general, the trends may indicate
an area of additional study that could reap significant benefits for air carriers in the
future.
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Fleet-wide Studies
The analysis of one variable related specifically to the type of aircraft operated;
"traffic lookout." It is well known that automation in the aircraft cockpit is intended to
reduce pilot workload, thus providing more time for human-oriented tasks such as traffic
watch. Industry experience, however, suggests that the additional machine monitoring
duties imposed on the pilot may negate any perceived improvement in overall workload.
There are basically four types of aircraft in the subject air carrier's fleet:
1. Fleet type 1 - the original "round-dial," analog cockpits of the early 1970s
(e.g., DC 9-30, B 727-200).
2. Fleet type 2 - transition cockpits consisting of capable autopilots, Flight
Management Systems (FMSs) and autothrottles (e.g., MD-80, B 737-300).
3. Fleet type 3 - mostly-glass cockpits with a complete FMS, moving map
displays, autothrottles, and performance enhancement computers (e.g., B 757200, B 767-200).
4.

Fleet type 4 - all glass cockpits with the most up-to-date navigation and
aircraft control systems available (e.g., B 717, B 777).

Figure 11 diagrams the results of the PPA regarding traffic lookout. As
automation incrementally increases (Fleet 1 through Fleet 4) the mean score for traffic
lookout improves as well, suggesting that automation does provide workload benefits that
may not be intuitively apparent to the industry.
Table 11 documents the comparison between all areas (KSA) and the various fleet
types. Note the consistent rise in scores from the least automated to most automated
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Figure 11. Traffic lookout mean scores/Fleet type

aircraft in all categories. Figure 12 illustrates this same information graphically. The only
variable that does not follow the trend is the high mean score for knowledge (Fleet 1)
which is higher than Fleets 2 and 3, and higher than would be expected relative to the

Table 11. Mean Knowledge, Skills and Abilities for Each Fleet Type.

Fleet
Fleet
Fleet
Fleet

1
2
3
4

N
3
30
24
7

Mean
knowledge
2.91
2.90
2.90
2.93

Mean skills
2.80
2.93
2.98
2.96

Mean
abilities
2.96
3.15
3.15
3.26

Total mean
2.88
2.96
2.97
2.99
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Figure 12. Mean KSA and total mean/Fleet type

other variables. Interestingly, Fleets 2, 3, and 4 utilize computer-based instruction for
many portions of initial training; Fleet 1 is the only aircraft type that employs personal
instructors exclusively for all "knowledge" based training.
The skills variable score for Fleet 1 appears slightly lower than would be
expected. It is possible that since the most junior pilots were usually assigned to that
aircraft, those F/Os had not yet had the opportunity to acquire or perfect their flying
skills. It may also be that the automation available in Fleets 2, 3, and 4 masks the fact that
the F/Os flying those aircraft did not need to demonstrate the "stick and rudder" skills
necessary to operate the aircraft in Fleet 1.

In the air carrier environment, the data generated by this PPA would be of major
interest to managers and directors in the safety, training, and flight standards
departments. Human resources professionals would want to be involved in the analysis of
data that might improve pilot hiring techniques, and aircraft fleet managers would be
eager to review specific aircraft/pilot performance information.
Evaluation of the quantitative aspects of the data generated by this PPA will
continue in Chapter V. Conclusions and recommendations will be presented, augmented
by additional qualitative observations and discussion.

Qualitative Data
An important aspect of this PPA was the unrestricted flow of information between
the F/O population and the air carrier's safety department. Additionally, the auditors
recorded their personal observations of general safety issues during the course of the
PPA. That qualitative data is summarized in this section - not so much for the purpose of
scientific analysis, but to present a more comprehensive overview of the operating
environment under which the PPA was conducted.

Personal Observations of Flight Crews
Once assured of the focus of the audit - anonymous data collection, not specific,
individual compliance verification with FARs or air carrier policies and procedures T/Os were eager to express their opinions to the observers. Those included:
1. Training - certain components of basic indoctrination, international
procedures, and security courses were regarded as "boring" and "ineffective,"
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with several pilots calling it "fill the square" training. Others felt there was too
much "training by bulletin," which also is generally perceived as ineffective.
2. Communication - while unrestricted flow of information between
management and crews is important, many F/Os felt that the methods used
were too diverse. Suggestions were submitted to coordinate the various
electronic (integral, crew-based computer system), paper, and web-based
technologies, for easier dissemination to the crews.
3. Operational - ground (vehicular) traffic on the ramp areas is a problem at the
major airports, particularly those that are "hubs" for the carrier. Several
suggestions were for additional "policing" of ramp traffic. Also, it was noted
that flight attendants and gate personnel need reminders not to interrupt flight
crews while completing checklists.

Personal Observations of the Auditors
There were many observations recorded on the evaluation forms, most of which
were directly related to F/O performance. Those served only to clarify scoring. But in
their final reports, the auditors also pointed out several other areas of concern, ones that
were not easily categorized on the forms, or related more to the operation in general.
They included:
1. Altitude awareness - many F/Os do not fully understand minimum altitudes as
presented on Jeppesen approach and enroute charts, and adherence to the air
carrier's own altitude verification procedures are not always complied with.
Most F/Os do not have a good working understanding of the new National
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Route Plan (NRP) requirements and procedures.
2. CRM - the observers noted a general lack of verbalization between crew
members.
3. Crew callouts - a general lack of knowledge regarding several specific
callouts, for altitude awareness, altimeter use, and engine monitoring.
4. Captain as "mentor" - interestingly, one auditor observed an F/O on two
different occasions, flying with two different Captains. On the first flight, the
Captain was a very "laid-back" individual, generally relaxed about procedural
compliance. The F/O's performance was rated as below average. On the
second trip, the F/O was teamed with a very professional, more demanding
Captain. The F/O's performance (observed scores) increased dramatically.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

"The foundation of air safety is essentially the willingness to examine, recognize,
report, and discuss conditions that require remedy" (Air Safety Investigator Quinn,
Quantas Airlines, personal communication, 1999). Mr. Quinn's observation is a valid,
and important one. The fundamental assumption in this premise, however, is that the data
used as a basis for examination, recognition, reporting, and discussion, is available. It is
the knowledge of "conditions that require remedy" that is the first, and primary,
prerequisite for an effective air safety program.

The PPA
The research question initially asked was, "Within an air carrier7 s pilot
population, are their KSAs directly related to the pilot's age, company longevity, total
flight time, or time in current position?" The results for this PPA show that there is a
definite relationship between these independent variables and F/O KSAs, and that the
resultant safety implications for an air carrier can be significant.

Knowledge
The "all knowledge" items mean score was 2.92, and 40% of the knowledge item's
charted linear regression lines originated at or below standard. These two findings
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are indicative of a pilot population that has not been fully educated in those areas
examined during the study, or have rapidly lost knowledge gained during training.
Another factor could be that as a new F/O became more comfortable with his
professional duties, complacency began to set in. Identifying this pattern and interceding
to reverse it is a primary responsibility of the flight safety professional.
The lowest knowledge scores were recorded in landing chart usage, policies and
procedures, diversion procedures, flight manuals, and company communications. Other
knowledge variables were found to be below standard as well.
The regression plots of virtually all knowledge items over time (either years of
service, time in current position, or total airline flight time) were flat or declined slightly,
indicating that the F/O's knowledge of these basic items does not increase once the pilot
has started line flying. The independent variable of total flight time was not in itself
considered significant in this analysis, as the other "time-related" variables provided the
necessary data. Age of F/Os had virtually no bearing on the results, other than when
plotted against equipment knowledge and Flight Policy Manual knowledge. As stated
previously, it is not clear why those two items do not correlate with all other knowledge
data patterns.
Perhaps the most disturbing finding, and the one with the greatest negative trend,
was F/Os' lack of knowledge of certain operational policies and procedures. This is
particularly applicable to those operations outside the normal, daily routine. In a few
cases, this could be a function of the type of training received, i.e. "training by bulletin."
The pilots themselves commented on their negative perceptions of certain aspects of the
air carrier's training (see Qualitative Data, Chapter IV).
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Skills
The "all skills" items mean score was only slightly below standard. Several items,
including cockpit/cabin briefings, traffic lookout, checklist usage, and use of spoilers,
brakes, reverse thrust, and autopilot, were identified as below standard. However, the
linear regression plots for most of the skills items indicated that pilot skills in general
improve over time, whether measured against years of service, time in current position, or
total airline flight time.
The data indicated that the F/Os are acquiring the necessary skills while in
training, and continue to develop them once flying on the line. Skills that rely on physical
manipulation of aircraft controls, such as crosswind landing, crosswind takeoff, and
normal landing improve at a greater rate than do observed interpersonal skills.

Abilities
The "all abilities" item mean score of 3.15 is well above standard. In particular,
areas critical to the safety of flight, such as CRM, decision-making, and safety awareness
scored well above standard. Personal appearance, attitude, and professionalism received
the highest scores in the audit. One interesting finding was that situational awareness was
the only abilities item to score below standard, which is significant because S A has been
identified in many studies as being a factor in recent CFIT accidents.
The regression line for each abilities item plotted against any of the time-related
variables indicated a strong downward-performing trend. While the personal attributes of
the F/Os hired are outstanding, negative influences of line flying markedly decreased
virtually all scores.

Probationary Pilot Scores
The mean KSA scores of new-hire pilots (less than 1 year of service) was plotted
against age and total flight time, and a quadratic regression performed. Results indicated
that the peak age for all KSA mean scores as well as total mean was related to age, with
(generally) older being better. Performing the same calculations with total flight time
indicated that there is a definite peak time for first-year pilot performance in every
category: approximately 7,000 hours of flight time.
Traditionally, air carriers have attempted to hire the youngest pilots possible with
the minimum experience necessary. Additional experience was welcomed, but not
necessarily at the expense of age. The sample size of the probationary pilot study group
in this study was small, so this researcher's confidence level in conclusions drawn from
this data is limited. However, additional research may produce similar results. That is,
that the guidelines used for pilot hiring may need to be reevaluated; emphasis on
increased age and "ideal" experience levels may be of significant benefit to an air carrier.

Fleet-wide Studies
This study has generated some interesting observations. First, the level of
automation utilized in an aircraft cockpit related directly to the amount of outside traffic
watch practiced by the F/O (more automation allows for more outside scan). Future
studies could focus on this particular issue, thus reinforcing the argument that
automation, when properly understood and monitored, does provide a greater level of
flight safety, in terms of the traffic separation environment.
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Secondly, while the total mean scores were directly related to the aircraft type,
with the lowest scores on the oldest, least-automated aircraft, the relative mean
knowledge scores were the highest for the oldest aircraft. Data from future studies might
clarify whether this phenomenon derives from two slightly different F/O populations
(e.g., less experienced vs. older), or from differences in training, such as human vs.
computer-based instruction methods.
Finally, the fleet-wide data highlighted an unexpected disparity in flying skills.
The older, less automated aircraft produced the lowest skills scores, while the most
automated produced the highest scores. Perhaps F/Os flying the automated aircraft
actually did demonstrate a higher skill level; or, because the aircraft was "flying itself as
a result of more advanced technology, the observers might only have had the impression
of higher skill levels. Conversely, the non-automated aircraft F/O, flying the aircraft
manually, might have demonstrated what appeared to be a lower level of skill, but might
actually be more capable in the traditional "flight skills" sense. Future research could be
designed to clarify this issue.

Air Safety Programs
The second research question asked at the beginning of this study was: "Could an
individual pilot's KSA data be integrated into the air carrier's overall data collection
process to enhance flight safety?" The simple answer is, "Absolutely!"
For flight operations, it is essential that the flight performance data gathered is
both accurate and appropriate. Safety programs have traditionally focused their efforts in
the following areas:
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1. FOQA provides excellent data on the performance of an aircraft (and to a
lesser extent the pilot) in the line environment. The information is most useful
for a general overview of flight operations events and exceedances, or review
of specific "incident" flights: Strengths - identification of aircraft and flight
crew operational performance; weaknesses - negative performance
monitoring only, no specific individual pilot knowledge or abilities rating.
2. ASAP identifies operational safety issues by thoroughly documenting
potential pilot violations, including deviations from clearances and established
procedures: Strengths - volume of data allows identification and continual
monitoring and trending of safety issues; weaknesses - negative performance
monitoring only, limited individual pilot skills information, no pilot
knowledge or abilities ratings.
3. LOSA provides a crew-based perspective of line operations: Strengths thorough assessment of crew-based performance in the line environment;
weaknesses - very limited individual pilot information observed or recorded.
The LOSA is complementary to a PPA, but its primary purpose is exploration
of human performance related to threat and error management, rather than
pilot performance measurement.
4. AQP provides both individual and crew-based information on pilot skills in a
"rehearsed" environment: Strengths - accurate observations and ratings of
pilot performance during specific simulator sessions and LOFT scenarios;
weaknesses - provides no information regarding pilot knowledge, skills, or
abilities operating in the actual line environment.
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Specifically, quantitative line pilot performance data that is difficult to collect in
traditional safety programs is the primary focus of a PPA. Table 1 in Chapter I of this
report highlights those types of data that, for the most part, are generated exclusively by
the application of a PPA - individual pilot knowledge, and individual pilot abilities.
All aviation safety professionals would agree that having access to any of this
information is important. The air carrier safety experience of this researcher is the basis
for the belief that all of it is necessary to build a complete, comprehensive aviation safety
program. Each component complements the next; each is necessary to the success of the
overall safety process.
Figure 13 is an illustration of how the overall process might function. The loop
diagram can be entered at any point, depending on where the initial safety deficiency is
identified. For example, FOQA data might indicate that final approaches flown in a
particular aircraft type at a specific airport are tend to be "high energy," and not fully
stabilized. ASAP reports would confirm the air carrier's line pilot's concerns with these
specific approach events. Procedures and policies, if necessary, would be modified, and
those changes issued to the flight crews. If possible, air traffic control (ATC) personnel
could be included in the process for possible modification of traffic handling techniques.
AQP could confirm that the new procedures are being trained properly, and a subsequent
PPA would be designed to determine any problems associated with the operational
implementation of the policies, thus verifying the augmented training. A LOSA could
then confirm, from a system safety perspective, that the process has been effective.
FOQA would then be used to monitor approaches at the airport, confirming that the
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problem has been resolved. If operational problems persist, the process would begin
again, and the loop would continue until consistently stable approaches were observed.
Each individual program is an integral component of the loop process, identifying
specific air carrier deficiencies, or monitoring or confirming specific operational issues.
But it is also important to note that not every step of the loop is necessary for each safety
deficiency being addressed. Frequently, specific issues can be resolved using just a few
of the steps in the loop. The full complement of programs, however, assures that every
aspect of the air carrier's operation is fully monitored.

Equipment
FOQA \

-J^

ASAP

eS
L^J*
LOSA

AIR SAFETY
PROGRAM

\ * / C
AQP

Figure 13. The system safety loop of air carrier safety programs

Recommendations
A thorough review of instructional techniques (computer-based vs. human,
teaching aids, etc.) would be beneficial in determining suitability in the current air carrier
training environment. Additional emphasis is needed in both initial and recurrent training
on those subject areas (knowledge and skills) found by this study to be below standard.
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It would be appropriate to review ASAP and FOQA databases to determine if
below standard areas (within any KSA group) are the subjects of, or related to, other
recent program findings at the subject air carrier. Analysis of those relationships (if any)
could determine the most effective way to improve education (knowledge), training
(skills), and personal performance (abilities).
As noted in the qualitative data, a F/O's performance can be dramatically altered
by the level of professionalism demonstrated by the Captain. F/Os usually will adopt the
Captain's "culture," even if it is in psychological disagreement with the F/O's style.
CRM experience confirms that junior F/Os will seek a certain comfort level by not
outperforming their job-related superior (Captain). The importance of the role the Captain
plays in developing and maintaining a professional culture among F/Os cannot be
overstated. Air carriers must recognize this fact and implement programs to encourage
Captains to assist in the continual professional growth of the new-hire pilot group.
The use of proven programs, such as experienced peer mentoring and
probationary interviews and testing requirements, should be encouraged. These programs
can stimulate additional study and understanding of the knowledge-based requirements of
the air carrier. The mentors could also provide support for continual development of
personal abilities/attributes, e.g. professionalism, personal appearance, etc.) as well as
providing a continual conduit of two-way information flow.
Air carrier safety professionals must be alert to tendencies toward complacency
within any pilot group, and devise methods to reverse those trends. ASAP and FOQA can
be particularly useful in this regard.
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Initial and recurrent training requirements should be reassessed, perhaps with an
enhanced emphasis on knowledge based issues. The industry has been successful at
training flight skills to proficiency, and those skills must continue to be monitored.
However, with the increase in the use of flight automation, a fundamental shift in
educational thought might be appropriate.
A scientifically designed, professionally implemented PPA should be utilized by
any air carrier on a regular basis. The audit should focus on pilots within a particular
aircraft fleet type, crew position, experience level, or other specific group within the air
carrier's pilot population. The data should be combined with information from other
safety programs to determine appropriate corrective measures (if necessary) and to
recommend follow-on studies within the overall program. Maintenance of absolute
confidentiality is a must; accurate records should be retained for comparative analysis
from study to study.
A well-designed, appropriately conducted PPA can be a valuable addition to the
air carrier's safety program toolbox. The PPA augments the overall data collection
process, confirms findings, and supports the recommendations resulting from
collaborative use of the other fundamental safety programs - LOSA, FOQA, ASAP and
AQP. As the industry continually changes, particularly with the introduction of "nextgeneration" concepts like the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS), evolution of
aviation safety philosophy will be essential. The safety program loop and the PPA are
integral to the safe, successful air transportation system of the future.
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PILOT PROFICIENCY AUDIT FORM
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CORPORATE SAFETY

Internal Evaluation Program, Study 01-01
A/C Type
Age
Total T

#
PF/PM
Prob. Comp.
TT in cur.pos

DoH
M/F
Airline Time

Trip Planning
International planning
Weather review
Computer flight plan
Dispatch procedures
Weight & Balance
MEL

1

2

3

4

5

Pre-Takeoff
Cockpit/Cabin briefing
Walkaround
Preflight (cockpit)
ATIS, clearance, etc.
Departure nav setup
Eng start, powerback
Ramp congestion
Engine out taxi
Taxi procedures
T/O performance
T/O briefing
T/O alert

1

2

3

4

5

Takeoff and Departure
Rejected T/O
Normal T/O
Crosswind T/O
Noise abatement procedures
Min man speeds, bank angles
SID, departure procedures

1

Climb, Enroute, Descent
Transition level/alt
Climb & descent speeds
Autopilot use
Optimum cruise speeds/alt
Weather - Radar
Fuel management
Int'l navigation
Diversion / alternate
FMS / enroute navigation
Descent planning
Speed / altitude restrictions
Holding

1

2

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

Approach and Landing
Knowledge of min, ops spex
Approach planning / briefing
Landing charts
Terminal speeds / altitudes
Approach nav setup
Use of autoflight systems
Monitored app procedures
Non-precision app
Precision / manual app
Precision / autoflight app
Speed / sink control, stab app
Slot / line up recognition
Go-around readiness
Threshold clearance height
Normal landing
Crosswind landing
Use of spoilers, reverse, brks

1

2

3

4

5

Post Landing
Taxi procedures
Engine out taxi
Secure cockpit
Logbook, maint

1

2

3

4

5

General
Attitude
Safety awareness
Equipment knowledge
Flight Ops policy knowledge
Procedures / policies
Professionalism
Company communications
Smoothness / precision of fit
Checklist usage
Traffic lookout
Personal appearance
Command Ability / CRM
Situational awareness
Workload management
Decision Making
Cockpit discipline sterile ckpt
CRM

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

86
Overall Evaluation:
Rating Guide
Comments

| 1: Unacceptable | 2: Below Standard | 3: Standard | 4: Above Standard | 5: Superior

